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1 Introduction
Despite the growing number of policies aimed at reducing global warming, emissions grew
more quickly between 2000 and 2010 than in any of the three previous decades (IPCCs Fifth
Assessment Report, 2014). Annual greenhouse gas emissions have increased by precisely one
gigatonne equivalent of dioxide carbon CO2 (2.2%) over the past decade alone.1 Such an increase
in pollution poses the threat of a catastrophic increase in global temperatures, triggering strong
reactions from, among others, several economists.
In fact, G. Mankiw, W. Nordhaus, J. Stiglitz and others have recently argued that a global
harmonizedcarbon tax should be applied. A rst argument is summarized by Mankiw (N-Y.
Times, October 16th, 2007) as follows:
"The scientists tell us that world temperatures are rising because humans are
emitting carbon into the atmosphere. Basic economics tells us that when you tax
something, you normally get less of it. So if we want to reduce global emissions of
carbon, we need a global carbon tax. Q.E.D."
In other words, a global carbon tax would be an ideal instrument because it would address
both domestic and transboundary pollution. The second main argument refers to the well-
known carbon leakage issue. In a globalized world, production activities can shift to countries
with laxer environmental policies such that decentralized environmental policies are less e¤ective
in reducing emissions. Hence, a global carbon tax is desirable because it would be neutral with
respect to any delocalization strategy of rms.
In this paper, we investigate the e¤ects of a global carbon tax and its ability to curb carbon
emissions in a globalized economy characterized by an uneven spatial distribution of heterogen-
eous rms. Our results challenge the claim that a global carbon tax could succeed in improving
the quality of environment without raising competitiveness concerns. Indeed, we argue that
although a global carbon tax is an attractive environmental measure, it may be subject to
debate because, among other e¤ects, it can have a signicant impact on the location of (het-
erogeneous) rms as well as on foreign trade patterns worldwide. We evaluate these e¤ects by
1In comparison, greenhouse gas emissions grew on average by 0.4 gigatonne equivalent of CO2 per year (1.3%)
from 1970 to 2000. The last IPCC report also states that half of cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions
between 1750 and 2010 have occurred within the last 40 years.
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investigating the introduction of a global carbon tax on emissions in the context of a global-
ized economy characterized by international trade and rm mobility. We build a trade model
with asymmetric countries, heterogeneous and mobile rms inspired by Okubo et al. (2010).
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are a byproduct of the production activity of manufacturing
rms, which we assume export part of their production. Therefore, our model accounts for the
fact that CO2 emissions, embodied in international trade, are an important contributing factor
of the increase in emissions, especially in countries such as China (Ahmad and Wycko¤, 2003;
Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Weber et al., 2008; Lin and Sun, 2010).2 Moreover, manufacturing
rms are assumed to be either clean or dirty depending on the technology they adopt, with
each technology associated with a specic level of production cost. It follows that a global
carbon tax policy a¤ects the location choices of clean and dirty rms in di¤erent ways. This
framework allows for the analysis of the location decision of dirty and clean rms, the e¤ect of
a carbon tax on trade patterns and, nally, the e¢ ciency of a global carbon tax in reducing
global emissions. To focus on this subject, we abstract from all the political-economic factors
that make a global carbon tax a public policy di¢ cult to implement.
By characterizing the location equilibria of heterogeneous rms according to the level of
trade costs, we rst show that trade liberalization leads to more agglomeration in the larger
country, which in turn raises global emissions. Thus, the need for a global carbon tax is
becoming higher as trade costs fall. Nevertheless, when di¤erent market sizes and increasing
returns to scale are considered, a carbon tax, even a global one, is not a spatially neutral policy
instrument. We show that the implementation of a global carbon tax might have unexpected
e¤ects on environmental quality because of the relocation e¤ects it generates. Specically, a
su¢ ciently low level of carbon has only positive e¤ects for the environment; it lowers pollution
emissions in any equilibrium spatial congurations and induces spatial relocations that are less
harmful for the environment. Furthermore, we show that there exists a threshold value of the
carbon tax above which trade patterns are considerably a¤ected; in fact, rms cease to trade
in the foreign country. Importantly, we show that this situation is a dark side of the e¤ects of
a global carbon tax because such a no-trade e¤ect may lead to the disappearance of the most
environmentally friendly congurations.
Our contribution rst relates to the literature on the pollution haven hypothesis, according
2Such analysis builds on the distinction between emissions based on consumption and those based on pro-
duction (Peters, 2008).
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to which pollution-intensive industries would move to countries with less stringent environ-
mental regulation. Previous contributions generalize the model of reciprocal dumping by endo-
genizing the number of plants and their location (Markusen et al., 1993). Firms can react to a
tightening of environmental policies by shutting down the plant and transferring production to
plants in another country3. As a consequence, the decentralization of the environmental policy
leads government to behave non-cooperatively. Depending on the level of disutility associated
with pollution, government either chooses a strategy of environmental dumping or a strategy
of the type "Not In My Back Yard" (Markusen and al., 1995). Zeng and Zhao (2009) develop a
model in which manufacturing production generates cross-border pollution and location choices
are driven by international di¤erences in both environmental policy and agglomeration forces.4
The authors demonstrate that these manufacturing agglomeration forces alleviate the benets
of locating in a pollution haven.5 We contribute to this literature by analyzing whether the
centralization of environmental policy through a global carbon tax does avoid relocation e¤ects
and further analyzing the ability of the tax to improve environmental quality.
This paper also contributes to the broad literature on the environmental impact of trade
liberalization. Since the work of Grossman and Krueger (1993), it has become well known
that trade liberalization can a¤ect the environment through di¤erent channels. The question
whether the overall impact will be positive or negative has given rise to many theoretical
and empirical contributions (Sturm, 2003). Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) consider
pollution as a public bad and they develop a Ricardian model allowing both for income and
factor endowment di¤erences across countries6. Their empirical results indicate that the overall
impact of trade on environmental quality is positive but small. In our paper, we complement
this literature by showing how trade liberalization inuences the environment through rms
relocation strategies (rather than through technological-upgrading behavior) in an imperfectly
competitive economy. Specically, we show that the level of trade costs inuences both the level
3Taking into account the xed cost to set up a plant, Motta and Thisse (1994) demonstrate that such a
relocation is less likely to occur.
4Agglomeration forces stem from the assumptions of increasing returns to scale and asymmetric market sizes.
5Empirical evidence related to the pollution haven hypothesis is also mixed (Ederington et al., 2005; Jeppesen
et al. 2002; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003). Interestingly, Levinson and Taylor (2008) raise several methodological
issues that help explain why empirical studies have di¢ culties in demonstrating the existence of this e¤ect.
6Therefore, the inuence of di¤erences in factor endowment can dominate the impact of di¤erences in envir-
onmental policy on comparative advantage.
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of global emissions in the absence of a carbon tax and the ability of such a policy instrument
to improve environmental quality. Importantly, our theoretical contribution also allows for the
analysis of how global environmental measures a¤ect international trade patterns. We isolate
a novel e¤ect of the carbon tax on trade patterns that is not due to regulation externalities
among countries competing for FDIs or capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a model of
trade with rms that di¤ers with respect to rmsmarginal cost and emission intensity and
describe the outcome in the short run, when rms are immobile. In section 3, we describe the
location choice made by rms in the long run, when clean rms bear a higher net marginal
cost. In section 4, we analyze the ability of the global carbon tax to reduce global emissions.
Finally, we explore the e¢ ciency of the carbon tax when it is set at such a high level that dirty
rms su¤er a higher net marginal cost. The nal section concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider an economy with two countries (i = H;F ), two production factors (labor l and
physical capital n) and two sectors in which rms produce two homogeneous goods: i) an
industrial good x with a polluting technology and ii) a numéraire good z whose production
does not yield carbon emissions. Country H is supposed to host a share  > 1=2 of total
population l, and each individual is equally endowed with one unit of labor and n=l unit of
capital. Residents work and consume in the country they live in but invest their capital in
the country producing the highest return. Finally, we assume a supranational authority that
implements a global carbon tax t on per-unit carbon emissions.
2.1 Preferences
For analytical tractability, we assume that workers share the same quasi-linear utility function ui
with respect to the numéraire z and the manufactured good x, both goods being homogeneous.7
This assumption also allows for a focus on the role played by the technology. A consumer
residing in country i thus solves the following problem:
7Although the income e¤ect is erased with quasi-linear utility, Dinopoulos et al. (2007, p.22), show that this
type of preference behaves reasonably well in models of international trade.
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Max
xi
ui 

a  xi
2

xi   E + zi (1)
s:t: wi + z + r
n
l
= xipi + zi (2)
where a > 0, xi is the individual consumption level of the manufactured good, zi is the
individual consumption of the numéraire, z is the individual endowment in the numéraire, wi
the national wage rate, and r the world net return rate to capital. We assume that the initial
endowment z is large enough for the individual consumption of the numéraire to be strictly
positive at the market outcome. Finally,  captures the individual damage arising from the
total emissions of the manufacturing sector (E), which are assumed to spill over across the two
countries.
Given (1) and (2), the individual demand xi for the manufactured good is given by
xi =
a  pi

; 8 i = H;F:
2.2 Technology and market structure
Good z is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Specically, one
unit of labor is required to produce one unit of output. Moreover, this good is costlessly traded
and considered as the numéraire. Thus, its price as well as the individual wage rate are equal
to one in each country as soon as this sector is active in both countries, i.e., wi = 1; i = H;F:
By contrast, good x is produced under increasing returns to scale and yields carbon emissions
that di¤er across rms. We consider two types of rms in particular, clean (c) and dirty (d),
whose per-unit levels of carbon emission are given by "k with k = c; d. Pollution is considered a
global public bad. In other words, the utility loss induced by one unit of emissions from country
i is the same wherever individuals are located. Indeed, CO2 emissions are considered a global
problem that justies an internationally coordinated mitigation policy such as a global carbon
tax.
Each type of rm requires one unit of capital to produce any amount of good x. The
marginal requirement in labor can be viewed as a pollution abatement cost that varies across
rms. There is a share  of dirty rms whose marginal requirement in labor is normalized to
zero (because they do not abate pollution) and whose per-unit emission level is given by "d. By
contrast, the remaining 1  share of rms are clean and pollute less, "c < "d, because of their
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marginal requirement of m > 0 units of labor. Abatement costs usually quantify di¤erent types
of expenditures for pollution abatement. They may involve design costs for a new process of
production but also managerial e¤ort for the required paperwork. In our paper, for simplicity,
we assume a xed amount of capital in each rm, but the abatement may change the intensity
of use of this unit of capital per unit of labor, ultimately changing the labor requirement for
each unit of good x produced.
Finally, we consider that the manufactured good is costly traded. Each rm incurs a trade
cost of  > 0 units of the numéraire per unit of good x shipped between the two countries.
2.3 Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run equilibrium, the location of each type of rm in each country is given. There are
nh rms located in country H, and the rest, n nh; are located in F . Labor, capital and goods
markets are cleared. Firms in the manufacturing sector produce under Cournot competition.
Product markets are segmented because of trade costs (as in Brander and Krugman, 1983);
that is, each rm determines a specic quantity to trade to the country in which its product is
sold. Thus, the net prots of a k-type rm (k = c; d) located in country i selling its good in
country i and country j; are given by
ci = (pi  m  t"c)xcii + (pj  m  t"c   )xcij   ri
di = (pi   t"d)xdii + (pj   t"d   )xdij   ri
where xkii is the quantity the rm supplies to domestic consumers and x
k
ij is the quantity
it sells to foreign consumers. Moreover, ri is the rental rate of capital in country i, which is
equalized across countries due to capital mobility rH = rF = r. The rst-order condition for
clean rms yields the following output choices:
xchh =
l

(ph  m  t"c) and xchf =
(1  )l

(pf  m  t"c   )
for a rm located in country H, and
xcff =
(1  )l

(pf  m  t"c) and xcfh =
l

(ph  m  t"c   )
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for a rm located in country F. Mirror expressions hold for dirty rms,m being replaced by 0
and "c by "d: Solving the market-clearing condition for each country, we obtain the equilibrium
prices pi in the short run:
pi =
a+ nj + n!
n+ 1
; i; j = h; f
where ! = (1 )(m+ t"c)+ t"d represents the average marginal cost after taxation. The
di¤erence in prices is ph   pf = (nf   nh)=(n+ 1).
Before describing the equilibrium output, some comments are in order. First, the price level
in a country decreases with the number of rms located in the country as competition becomes
ercer. Second, the distribution of rms between the two technologies modulates the price level
through its e¤ect on the average marginal cost. Indeed, we have
@pi
@
=
n
n+ 1
(t("d   "c) m) :
Intuitively, the price level increases with the share of clean rms (@pi=@ < 0) in the economy
as long as their marginal cost is higher than the marginal cost of dirty rms. Although this is
always the case in the absence of carbon tax t, the reverse may hold when the supranational
authority determines its implementation. More precisely, @pi=@ > 0 holds if and only if
t > t  m
"d   "c : (3)
Third, we observe that the implementation of a positive carbon tax yields higher prices:
@pi
@t
=
n
n+ 1
((1  )"c + "d) > 0; i = h; f:
This tax incidence e¤ect is proportional to the average emission intensity (1   )"c + "d.
In particular, the incidence of the carbon tax will be strong when the manufacturing sector is
mainly composed of dirty rms. Despite this tax incidence e¤ect on price, it is straightforward
to determine whether the implementation of the carbon tax always deteriorates the margin of
the most polluting rms, which also holds for the less polluting rms if and only if
n <
"c
"d   "c : (4)
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Because it is more realistic to consider that the tax incidence e¤ect is not strong enough
for the impact of the carbon tax on rmsmargin to be negative, we assume hereafter that the
latter inequality holds.
Despite the positive impact of trade costs on the price level (because trade costs protect
against foreign competition), the overall impact of trade costs on the export margin is negative.
At this stage, recall that our aim is to analyze how, by altering the spatial distribution of dirty
and clean rms, a global carbon tax may a¤ect emissions. To this end, we must account for the
signicant share of CO2 emissions that are reputed to be embodied in trade. According toWeber
et al. (2008), approximately one-third of Chinese emissions were caused by the production of
exports in 2005 versus 12% in 1987 and 21% in 2002. In the following, we focus on equilibrium
congurations in which bilateral trade ows occurs. As a consequence, trade cost values are
assumed to be low enough for exports to be protable for rms whatever their typetheir
distribution across countries and the overall distribution across types. Two scenarios must be
considered to dene this trade condition.
i) If t < t (clean rms have the highest marginal cost), the trade condition stipulates that
the export margin of a clean rm on the largest market (pch  m     t"c) is positive when all
other rms are dirty ( = 1) and located in the largest country as well (nf = 0); that is, when
 <  trade (see below).
(ii) If t > t (dirty rms have the highest marginal cost), the trade condition requires that
the export margin of a dirty rm on the largest market (pdh      t"d) be positive when all
other rms are clean ( = 0) and located in the largest country as well (nf = 0); that is, when
 <  0trade:
We summarize this trade condition by the following inequality:
 < min f <  trade;  <  0tradeg
After performing calculations, we obtain the following:
 trade =
a m(n+ 1) + nt("d   "c)  t"c
n+ 1
 0trade =  trade +
2n+ 1
n+ 1
(m+ t("c   "d)).
Hereafter, we assume a > m(n + 1)   t (n("d   "c)  "c) such that the abovementioned
thresholds are positive regardless of the carbon tax level.
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Then, substituting for the equilibrium prices in the output choices, we obtain the equilibrium
output in the short run. For clean rms, the quantities are described as follows:
xchh =
l

h
a+nf +n!
n+1
  (m+ t"c)
i
and xchf =
(1 )l


a+n!+nh
n+1
  (m+ t"c + )

for a rm located in country H and
xcff =
(1 )l


a+nh+n!
n+1
  (m+ t"c)

and xcfh =
l

h
a+n!+nf 
n+1
  (m+ t"c + )
i
for a rm located in country F .
Mirror expressions hold for dirty rms, for which "c is replaced by "d and m by 0. It is
observed that because of trade costs, a rm sells less on the export market than its indigenous
rival does, xkfh = x
k
hh   l=, regardless of the rms type. Moreover, sales on a given market
are higher for the type of rm that enjoys the lowest marginal cost.
For clarity, we analyze the e¤ect of the carbon tax under the two scenarios (i) and (ii)
separately. We start in sections 3 and 4 by analyzing the scenario in which the carbon tax
remains within the interval t < t, implying that clean rms have the highest marginal cost.
Scenario (ii) is discussed in Appendix 4.
3 Long-run spatial equilibrium
In this section, we assume that t 2 (0; t] : Equation (3) indicates that this scenario may occur
because the marginal labor requirement of clean rms is large, the di¤erence in the per-unit
emissions of the two types of rms is not large and/or the carbon tax is low. Consequently,
 0trade(t) >  trade(t); yielding the following simplied trade condition:
 <  trade(t) (5)
In the long run, the number of rms located in each country is endogenously determined by
the condition that no rm has an incentive to move. Moreover, the equilibrium rate of return
to capital is determined by the zero-prot condition. In other words, the operating prots
evaluated at the equilibrium prices and quantities are completely absorbed by the return to
capital, and no rm can protably enter the market. Formally, we have
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rch =
l

[ph  m  t"c]2 +
(1  )l


pf  m  t"c   
2
(6)
rcf =
l

[ph  m  t"c    ]2 +
(1  )l


pf  m  t"c
2
: (7)
Similar expressions hold for dirty rms, for which "c is replaced by "d and m by 0.
Now, we can analyze the spatial di¤erences in return to capital for each type of rm to
determine where capital owners decide to invest their capital. The spatial di¤erences in the net
return to capital 4ri = rih   rif are as follows:
rc = l
(n  2nh   2+ 1) + 2(2  1)(a  (n+ 1)(m+ t"c) + n!)
(n+ 1)
(8)
rd = l
(n  2nh   2+ 1) + 2(2  1)(a  (n+ 1)t"d + n!)
(n+ 1)
(9)
where a  (n+ 1)(m+ t"c) + n! and a  (n+ 1)t"d + n! are positive for all positive values
of  trade. Now, let us denote by sk the share of k-type rms located in country H, such that
the number of rms in country H can be written as nh = nsd + (1  )nsc where (1  )scn
and sdn represent the number of clean and dirty rms in country H, respectively. Replacing
nh by nsd + (1   )nsc and the average marginal cost ! by its value in (8) and (9), we can
analyze how these variables react to a change in the spatial distribution of k -type rms, sk,
or in the distribution of rms across types, . It is straightforward to verify that dk=dsk < 0
8k = c; d due to higher competition. Thus, location equilibria are stable.
The carbon tax triggers two opposing forces on the spatial di¤erence in return to capital:
@rk
@t
=
2l

(2  1)
2664 @ph@t|{z}
tax incidence (+)
  @t"i
@t|{z}
marginal cost (-)
3775 ; k = c; d
In the presence of market size asymmetry,  > 1=2, the tax incidence force exacerbates the
di¤erence in returns to capital across countries, whereas the impact of the carbon tax on the
marginal cost has the opposite sign. The net impact is always negative for dirty rms, whose
tax burden is raised by their high emissions, which is also the case for clean rms as long as
the e¤ect on the marginal cost dominates that on the tax incidence, as we assumed in (4).
Consequently, we have
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@rc
@t
< 0 and
@rd
@t
< 0 (10)
More importantly, a carbon tax erodes the benet of being in the large country more for
the dirty rms than for the clean ones :
@rc@t
 < @rd@t
 :
Hence, when di¤erent market sizes are considered, a global carbon tax is not a spatially
neutral policy instrument. Because the tax amount paid is proportional to the individual
output (the carbon tax is a quantity tax), the location in the large market becomes more
costly and some rms may relocate towards the small one with the aim of reducing the tax
burden. Consequently, the introduction of such taxation increases the attractiveness of the small
country. This mechanism takes place in the presence of homogeneous technologies (Exbrayat
et al, 2013) and is further accentuated for dirty rms when heterogeneous technologies coexist.
Finaly, we check that
rc  rd = 2l(2  1)t ("d   "c) m

< 0 (11)
which is negative because (3). Hence, because of a scale economies e¤ect, the spatial
di¤erence in net return to capital between the large and small countries is higher for dirty
rms that keep enjoying the lowest marginal cost after taxation. Because rc is always smaller
than rd, the long-run equilibrium location of rms cannot involve an interior conguration
with a partial coagglomeration between the two countries for each type of rms, that is, rc =
rd = 0. Importantly, all rms can never agglomerate in the small country because for nh = 0;
we have rc > 0 and rd > 0; implying that each rm, whether dirty or clean, has an incentive
to move to the large country.
We are now in a position to describe location equilibria in the long run. For this purpose,
let us rst dene the equilibrium spatial conguration of rms when a carbon tax is absent.
We rst demonstrate in Appendix 1 that n   2nh   2 + 1 is negative such that the spatial
di¤erence in return to capital decreases with trade costs, regardless of the type of rm (see (8)
and (9)). Therefore, let us dene the following:
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a = 2 (2  1) a m (n+ 1)
n+ 2  1 ;
 c  2 (2  1) a m (n+ 1)
n (2  1) + 2  1 ;
 d  2 (2  1) a+ n (1  )m
n (2  1) + 2  1 ;
where a and  c are obtained by requiring rc = 0 at spatial congurations (sc = 1; sd = 1)
and (sc = 0; sd = 1), respectively, whereas  d is obtained by requiring rd = 0 at spatial con-
gurations (sc = 0; sd = 1). We can easily check that a <  c <  d.
To dene the possible spatial congurations, let us consider the following:
~sc =
1
2
2  1
  1 + (2  1)
1
2
2(a m)  2nm  
n(1  ) ;
~sd =
1
2
+ (2  1)1
2
2a+ 22nmnm(1  )  
n
:
Then, as the level of trade cost decreses because of the process of trade integration, the
possible spatial congurations are as follows:
(i) partial selection of dirty rms and agglomeration of clean rms in the smaller country
( 0; ~s
d
) when  >  d;
(ii) perfect selection of dirty rms and clean rms ( 0; 1) when  d >  >  c ;
(iii) partial selection of clean rms and agglomeration of dirty rms in the larger country
( ~sc; 1) when  c >  > a;
(iv) co-agglomeration in the larger country ( 1; 1) when  6 a.
We prove in Appendix 1 that  d <  trade such that all of the abovementioned spatial
patterns are compatible with the trade feasibility condition.8 To understand this result, recall
the location forces that explain why we move from the most dispersed spatial pattern to more
agglomerated congurations. On the one hand, themarket size encourages rms to locate in the
larger country. Moreover, the derivatives drd=d > drc=d > 0 show that the market size
e¤ect is stronger for the dirty rms because they benet from a lower marginal cost. We verify
that d2rc=dd = d2rc=dd < 0, implying that this market size e¤ect increases with the
decrease in trade costs. On the other hand, we observe that drd=dnh = drc=dnh < 0 (see.
(8) and (9)) and d2rc=dnhd = d2rd=dnhd < 0. Thus, competition acts as a dispersion
8A similar conclusion is reached under monopolistic competition in Okubo et al (2010).
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force; however, decreasing trade costs weakens this force, whereas it amplies the agglomeration
force. This reasoning helps explain the shift from spatial conguration (i) to (ii), (ii) to (iii)
and from (iii) to (iv). During this process, dirty rms are the rst ones to move toward the
larger country. Indeed, they have the lowest marginal cost and thus are both more attracted
by the large country and less sensitive to the higher competition within this country.
We now turn attention to the long-run equilibrium location in the presence of a carbon tax.
Because the introduction of a carbon tax modies the spatial di¤erences in return to capital,
the threshold levels of trade costs are now expressed by
a (t)  a   tAa
 c(t)   c   tAc
 d(t)   d   tAd
with
Aa  2 (2  1) "c + n ("c   "d)
n+ 2  1
Ac  2 (2  1) "c + n ("c   "d) n+ 2+ 2n  1
Ad  2 (2  1) "d + n ("d   "c) (1  ) n+ 2+ 2n  1
and Ad > Ac > Aa > 0. Note that a (t) <  c(t) <  d(t) for any t , and each one
of this threshold values of  decreases with t. Consequently, the higher the carbon tax is,
the smaller the trade cost threshold that triggers the shift from one spatial conguration to
the other becomes. Thus, abstracting for a moment from the trade feasibility condition, a
positive carbon tax reduces the attractiveness of the larger country (see equation (10)). Indeed,
the carbon tax is a quantity tax that ultimately reduces the incentive to locate in the larger
country to produce on a larger scale. In other words, even when levied at the same rate, the
carbon tax distorts the location choices of heterogeneous mobile rms.
Similarly to the scenario involving a zero carbon tax, we can now dene spatial congura-
tions that may arise (see Figure 1). For this purpose, let us consider the following:
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~stc = ~sc   t (2  1)
"c + n ("c   "d)
n (1  ) ;
~std = ~sd   t (2  1)
"d + n ("d   "c) (1  )
n
:
It follows that the possible spatial congurations are as follows:
(i) Agglomeration of clean rms in the smaller country and partial selection of dirty rms
( 0; ~std) when  >  d(t);
(ii) Perfect selection of dirty rms in the larger country and clean rms in the smaller
country ( 0; 1) when  d(t) >  >  c(t);
(iii) Partial selection of clean rms and agglomeration of dirty ones in the larger country
( ~stc; 1) when  c(t) >  > a(t);
(iv) Co-agglomeration in the larger country ( 1; 1) when  6 a(t).
Can all these spatial congurations arise as location equilibria? To answer this question,
we must analyze whether the congurations are compatible with bilateral trade ows. The
following proposition shows that both the level of taxation and the market size asymmetry
a¤ect the set of equilibrium candidates:
Proposition 1 Given t 2 [0; t) and  2 [0;  trade) ; there exists threshold values of the carbon
tax t1, t2 and t3 such that
(a) if t  t1; then all spatial congurations (1; 1), (~stc; 1), (0; 1), (0; ~std) are location equilib-
ria;
(b) if t1 < t  t2; then spatial congurations (1; 1), (~stc; 1), (0; 1) are equilibria locations;
(c) if  > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) and t2 < t 6 t3 or if  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) and t2 < t 6 t,
then spatial congurations (1; 1) and (~stc; 1) are location equilibria;
(d) if  > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) and t > t3; then the only location equilibrium is (1; 1).
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The foregoing proposition states that low levels of the carbon tax, i.e., t  t1; leave the
type of spatial congurations that would arise in the absence of any carbon tax unchanged.
By contrast, as the carbon taxes exceeds the threshold value t1; certain spatial congurations
with trade cease to be stable equilibria because international trade ceases to be protable.
This result can be explained as follows. Di¤erent spatial congurations arise depending on the
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weight of two traditional forces shaping the location choices: the market size and the intensity
of competition. Introducing a carbon tax weakens the market size e¤ect. As a result, the
higher the carbon tax is, the smaller each of the threshold values of trade costs becomes (with
d d(t)=dt < d c(t)=dt < da(t)=dt < 0). Thus, ceteris paribus,
Corollary 1 A global carbon tax weakens agglomeration forces and favors the emergence of
dispersed equilibria of rmslocation.
As discussed in section 3, this e¤ect has repercussions for the level of pollution in both
countries.
However, this is not the end of the story. On the one hand, a global carbon tax reduces
most the trade conditions that dene agglomerated conguration favoring disperstion; on the
other, the tax does render the trade condition more binding (d trade=dt < 0) such that threshold
values  c(t) and  d(t) might become higher than  trade. In this case, the global carbon tax (in
the presence of strong asymmetry in country size) works againts dispersion. In fact, the most
dispersed spatial congurations become incompatible with the trade condition, whereas they
are compatible without such a tax. We call this the no-trade e¤ect, which occurs when t > t1
(i.e.,  d(t) >  trade), when t > t2 (i.e.,  c(t) >  trade) or t > t3 (i.e., a(t) >  trade).
Figure 1 illustrates the selection of location equilibria compatible with the trade condition
when countriessize satisfy either  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) (left panel) or  > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2)
(right panel), respectively. We summarize the result as follows:
Corollary 2 A high global carbon tax favors agglomeration when market sizes are strongly
asymmetric.
Hence, introducing a carbon tax may crucially a¤ect the set of possible location equilibria
and, in turn, the level of emissions. Now, the level of pollution corresponding to each spatial
conguration remains to be analyzed.
4 Pollution
To proceed with the analysis of global pollution, we evaluate total emissions stemming from
each spatial conguration when t = 0 and t > 0. Considering these two cases is essential for
the identication of various e¤ects of a carbon tax on pollution.
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When When
Figure 1: Location equilibria for all t < t
4.1 Global emissions in the absence of taxation
The function of global emissions for a given spatial distribution of clean and dirty rms (Ec+Ed)
can be expressed as follows:
E (sc; sd) =
0BBBBBB@
(2  1) 
0@ ncd (sd   sc) ("d   "c)
+c"csc + d"dsd
1A
+d ("d   "c) (a   +mnc)
+"c (a    mc)
1CCCCCCA
nl
 (n+ 1)
(12)
where sd > sc regardless of the equilibrium spatial conguration as long as t 2 (0; t]. We can
now incorporate the equilibrium values of sc and sd to analyze the evolution of global emissions
as we move from one spatial conguration to another.
Comparing the level of global emissions at the spatial conguration i) with ii), ii) with iii),
and nally iii) with iv), at the market equilibrium, we obtain the following:
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E (0; 1) ? E (0; ~sd) for all  ?  d
E (~sc; 1) ? E (0; 1) for all  7  c
E (1; 1) ? E (~sc; 1) for all  ? a
For all spatial congurations, the global emissions decrease with the level of trade costs but
not to the same extent. We easily check that dE (1; 1) =d > dE (0; 1) =d > dE (sc; 1) =d >
E (0; ~sd). The following graph illustrates the evolution of global emissions.
0
(0,sd)
(0,1)
(sc,1)
(1,1)
Global
emissions
Figure 2: Global emissions and trade cost without carbon taxation
Trade liberalization favors agglomeration in the larger country, which is also the most pollut-
ing spatial conguration, suggesting that trade liberalization is detrimental to the environment.
Two e¤ects underlie this specic path of pollution. First, for a given spatial pattern, trade lib-
eralization boosts the output per rm and thereby the level of emissions. Second, as is standard
in trade and location models, trade liberalization pushes for relocations from the small to the
larger country because of the attractiveness of its market size. Because average scale of produc-
tion is higher in this country, such relocations amplify emissions. Interestingly, the two e¤ects
are at work in congurations (i) and (iii), leading to a more intense increase in the level of
pollution. By contrast, only the quantity e¤ect occurs in congurations (ii) and (iv), leading
to a less accentuated rise in the level of pollution.
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4.2 Global emissions in the presence of a carbon tax
We can now analyze the environmental e¤ects of the implementation of a global carbon tax.
To address this issue, we start with the spatial congurations (1; 1) and (0; 1):
Et (1; 1) = E (1; 1)  t and Et (0; 1) = E (0; 1)  t
with  = nl
 ("d   "c) ("c + "d + n ("d   "c) (1  )) + "2c
 (n+ 1)
We check that  is positive under the assumption (4), such that the carbon tax reduces the
global level of emissions. Regarding these two spatial congurations, the reduction in emissions
is exclusively driven by the adjustment of the individual output of each type of rm (because
~std and ~s
t
c are constant). This Pigouvian e¤ect amounts to t.
Turning our attention to total emissions in the two other spatial congurations such that
at least one type of rm is partially agglomerated in the larger country. , we obtain
Et
 
~stc; 1

= E (~sc; 1)  t ( + ) and Et
 
0; ~std

= E (0; ~sd)  t ( + )
with  = l (2  1)2 ("c + n ("c   "d))
2
 (n+ 1)
and  = l (2  1)2 ("d + n ("d   "c) (1  ))
2
 (n+ 1)
Again, the implementation of a carbon tax clearly reduces emissions. However, it does so
through both a Pigouvian e¤ect (captured by ) and a relocation e¤ect (captured by  and ).
Indeed, recall that ~stc and ~s
t
d decline with t because the carbon tax reduces the spatial di¤erence
in returns to capital (through its negative impact on the di¤erence in net marginal cost between
dirty and clean rms). Therefore, a global carbon tax reduces the spatial concentration of clean
and dirty rms in the larger country. Importantly, this relocation e¤ect is stronger in the spatial
conguration with partial concentration of dirty rms ( > ) because the carbon tax exerts
a stronger e¤ect on the rmsmargin than on the margin of clean rms.
Finally, let us analyze the evolution of global emissions as we move along the equilibrium
path of spatial congurations. Assume for a moment that the carbon tax does not exceed the
threshold value t1 and thus bilateral trade ows may be observed under all four spatial cong-
urations. We can rank global emissions along the equilibrium path of spatial congurations as
follows:
19
Et (1; 1) > Et (~sc; 1) > E
t (0; 1) > Et (0; ~sd)
Therefore, although the function is shifted down because of the e¢ ciency of the carbon tax,
global emissions follows the same pattern as in the absence of it: They increase with trade
liberalization and with a more agglomerated pattern in the larger market (see. Figure 2).
0 t
(0,sd)
(0,1)
(sc,1)
(1,1)
Global
emissions
(1,1)
(sc,1)
(sc,1)
(0,1)
(0,1)
(0,sd)
Figure 3: Global emissions and trade cost with a carbon tax
However, note that the magnitude of the decrease in emissions strongly depends on the initial
spatial equilibrium and whether this spatial pattern is stable to the introduction of the carbon
tax. Indeed, taxing emissions a¤ects the threshold levels of trade costs, which all decrease and
thus shift to the left. As a consequence, certain initial spatial congurations become unstable,
and some rms may relocate to keep their protability unchanged. This is the relocation e¤ect
that arises when the trade cost belongs to the intervals (a (t) ; a), ( c (t) ;  c) or ( d (t) ;  d).
It can be observed that this e¤ect is large, and thus amplies the e¢ ciency of the carbon tax,
when the spatial pattern shifts from the co-agglomeration (1; 1) or perfect selection (0; 1) to a
pattern that combines partial selection for one type of rm and agglomeration for the other
((sc; 1) or (0; sd)). For these two congurations, Pigouvian and relocation e¤ects accumulate
and reinforce the e¤ect of the tax on pollution.
For example, consider the shift from (1; 1) to (sc; 1). The relocation of some clean rms to
the smaller market has two consequences. First, the new spatial distribution of clean rms
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is more environmentally friendly because dEtc=dsc > 0. Second, the most polluting rms, fully
concentrated in the larger market, face less competition in this market and thereby produce and
pollute more (dEtd=dsc < 0). Put di¤erently, the e¤ect on environment is positive for clean rms,
whereas it is negative for dirty ones. It is straightforward to check that jdEtc=dscj > jdEtd=dscj
for all n < "c="d   "c such that the positive e¤ect dominates. For the same reasons, pollution
strongly declines within the range ( d (t) ;  d): The relocation of some dirty rms from the
larger to the smaller market increases pollution from clean rms but decreases pollution from
dirty ones to a larger extent.
These elements suggest that the e¢ ciency of a global carbon tax policy is closely related
to both the initial spatial equilibrium and the level at which the tax is set. The following
proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 2 Assume a level of trade cost  2 (0; a) or  2 ( c;  d) such that co-agglomeration
(1; 1) or perfect selection (0; 1) is the initial spatial equilibrium. Starting from such congura-
tions, a global carbon tax will have a maximum e¤ect on pollution if it gives rise to relocations
from the larger market to the smaller one.
The above-described proposition illustrates the possibility that a carbon taxation induces
not only the Pigouvian e¤ect, which reduces pollution in each spatial conguration, but also
urges the relocation of rms from one country to the other, changing the type of spatial equi-
librium that arises at certain levels of trade cost.
Finally, as Proposition 1 states, in the presence of a carbon tax, some spatial congurations
may no longer arise as location equilibria. Indeed, arelatively high tax pressure might exclude
some spatial equilibria because trade becomes unprotable. If the carbon tax reaches and
exceeds the threshold value t1; the level of emissions may be the result of three e¤ects: the
Pigouvian and, possibly, the relocation and no-trade e¤ects. If the last e¤ect prevails, then one
or more location equilibria disappear.
It is worth stressing that the third e¤ect concerns the most environmentally friendly cong-
urations. As stated by Proposition 1, scenario (iv) will no longer be among the set of location
equilibria for this level of the carbon tax. Thus, the pollution curves appear as shown below:
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 A relatively small global carbon tax, t  t1; decreases the total level of pollution
through a Pigouvian e¤ect and a relocation e¤ect, leaving all spatial congurations to arise as
equilibrium locations. Under a su¢ ciently high level of the global carbon tax, t > t3; the tax
renders trade inconvenient, favoring agglomeration.
To conclude, we show that as long as the carbon tax does not exceed a threshold value
(namely t1), the policy has only positive e¤ects for the environment. It lowers emissions in any
spatial conguration and induces environmentally friendly spatial relocations. Nonetheless,
there exists a threshold value, i.e., t1, above which the e¤ects of taxation are more complex
because the set of candidate equilibria is modied. More precisely, the most environmentally
friendly spatial congurations can be removed.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the ability of a fully harmonized carbon tax to curb carbon emissions
in a globalized economy characterized by an uneven spatial distribution of heterogeneous rms.
Our results challenge the claim that a global carbon tax could succeed in improving the quality
of environment without raising competitiveness concerns.
We rst show that regardless of its level, a global carbon tax might encourage some rms
to relocate their activity. Importantly, the level of the carbon tax matters for the direction of
the relocation and its impact on global emissions. When the carbon tax is low enough, rms
relocate to the smaller country to pay lower taxes by reducing their output. In addition to
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the Pigouvian e¤ect of the carbon tax, this relocation reduces global emissions by promoting a
less concentrated spatial distribution of activities. Interestingly, this relocation strategy never
involves clean and dirty rms at the same time. Specically, low-cost rms relocate to the
smaller country at an earlier stage of trade liberalization than high-cost rms do. Indeed,
because they su¤er a higher post-tax marginal cost, the latter are both less attracted by the
large country and more sensitive to the higher competition within this country. If, however,
the carbon tax is too high, then rmsprotability on the export market can be threatened,
and they react by relocating to the larger country to maintain their export activity. In such a
case, the Pigouvian e¤ect of the carbon tax can be counteracted by the relocation e¤ect, giving
rise to a more polluting spatial distribution of rms.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Equilibrium spatial locations in absence of carbon tax
To prove that spatial congurations (i),(ii),(iii) and (iv) are equilibria locations when t = 0, we
simply need to prove that the trade condition evaluated at t = 0 is such that  trade(0)   d: If
this condition is satised then there exist ranges of values of  such that any of the four spatial
scenarios can arise as an equilibrium. Recall that  d = 2 (2  1) a+nm(1 ) (n 2 2n+1) and  trade(0) =
a m(n+1)
n+1
; where   (n  2  2n+ 1) > 0 for the positivity of  d: It is easily checked that  d
depends negatively on  hence if  trade(0)   d when  = 0; then  trade(0)   d is true for any
: Hence, assuming  = 0; and directly comparing  d and  trade(0) we obtain that  trade(0)   d
i¤ (n  2+ 1) > 0 and (2a+ 2m+ 4mn2 + 4an+ 6mn)  (a+m+ 3mn2 + an+ 4mn) > 0:
The rst inequality is true because n > 1 and  < 1: The second expression is positive as long
as  > 1
2
; which is true by assumption. In fact the second expression is positive for  = 1
2
and
being increasing in ; it remains positive for the whole range  2 1
2
; 1

:
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
To show which are the candidate equilibrium locations when t < t, we investigate the sign of
rd and rc in the admissible set of  ; namely  <  trade: Two cases arise:
1) if (n  2nh   2+ 1) > 0 , nh < n2  
 
  1
2

; then, rd > rc > 0: Hence, the
candidate equilibrium locations that can arise in the feasible set is only scenario (i), namely
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coagglomeration in country H. However, this cannot be an equilibrium location, because
coagglomeration in the large country sc = s

d = 1 is in contradiction with the condition nh <
n
2
  (  1
2
) !
2) if (n  2nh   2+ 1)  0, nh  n2  
 
  1
2

; then, the candidate equilibrium locations
are all four spatial congurations9. We know that for any t 2 [0; t) ;  d(t) >  c(t): These two
thresholds as well as the trade condition  trade(t) are monotonic decreasing functions of t: Then,
to spot the location equilibria, for any t 2 [0; t) ; we shall investigate the value of the trade
condition for t (knowing from Appendix 1 that for t = 0;  trade >  d(0): If the trade condition
at t; is higher than  c(t); then all four spatial congurations are equilibrium location for any
admissible  and t: First notice that at t we have
 c(t) =  d(t) = 2 (2  1) a"d   a"c  m"d
("d   "c) (  (n  2  2n+ 1))
while the corresponding trade cost threshold is
 trade(t) =
a"d   a"c  m"d
(n+ 1) ("d   "c)
which are both positive.
Taking the di¤erence  trade(t)   c(t); we have
 trade(t)   c(t) = ( n+ 2+ 4n  2nh   1) (a"c   a"d +m"d)
(n+ 1) [ (n  2n  2+ 1)] ("d   "c)
which is negatively signed (implying  c(t) >  trade(t)) if and only if the numerator
( n+ 2+ 4n  2nh   1) (a"c   a"d +m"d) < 0:
It can be easily checked that if [ (n  2nh   2+ 1)] > 0 then
( n+ 2+ 4n  2nh   1) > 0: While the second component (a"c   a"d +m"d)
is positive due to positivity of  trade (t). It follows that if  c(t) >  trade(t); and for any
t 2 [0; t) ;  d(t) >  c(t): Then, in the interval t 2 [0; t) ; the curve  trade(t) intercepts once the
curve  d(t). Call this intercept t1. And  trade(t) intercepts once the curve  c(t): Call this second
intercept t2:
9Notice that, as we said, rc < rd < 0 is never an equilibrium location because it does not satisfy the
condition nh  n2   (  12 ). By contrast, we verify that n(0;sd)h > n2  
 
  12

for all positive trade condition.
Given that n(0;sd)h < n
(0;1)
h < n
(sc;1)
h < n
(1;1)
h , candidate location equilibria are the four remaining spatial
congurations (0; sd), (0; 1), (sc; 1) and (1; 1).
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Let us now analyze the position of a (t) with respect to the other threshold values. We
rst verify that:
 c(t)  a (t) = 4n (1  ) (2  1) a"c   a"d +m"d
(n+ 2  1) ( n+ 2+ 2n  1) ("c   "d)
is positive. Moreover, the di¤erence between  trade(t) and a(t) writes:
 trade(t)  a (t) = (3n  2  4n+ 1) a"c   a"d +m"d
(n+ 1) (n+ 2  1) ("c   "d)
We verify that a (t) 7  trade(t) when  7 (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2). Then, the curve  trade(t) inter-
cepts once the curve a(t) and we call this intercept t3:Then, t3 lies in the interval t 2 [0; t) if
 > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) whereas it lies in the interval t 2 [t; +1) otherwise. Moreover, we check
that d d (t) =dt < d c (t) =dt < da (t) =dt < 0. Therefore, we conclude that t1 < t2 < t3 < t
when  > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) whereas t1 < t2 < t < t3 when  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2).
Consequently, for t < t1;  trade(t) >  d(t) (recall that for t = 0; we proved in Appendix 1
that  trade(t) >  d(t)). Then, all four scenarios arise as equilibrium locations. If t1  t  t2;
then  d(t) does not lie in the admissible set of values, implying that scenario (iv) cannot arise in
equilibrium. For values of the carbon tax higher than t2, we must distinguish between two cases.
If  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2), then all carbon tax values that lie in the interval [0; t) are lower than
t3. Therefore, only a(t) lie in the admissible set of values, implying that congurations (i)
and (ii) are the only equilibrium scenarii. If, however,  > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2), the equilibrium
congurations depend on wether the carbon tax is higher or lower than t3. Congurations (i)
and (ii) are the only equilibrium scenarii when t2  t  t3, whereas only conguration (i) arises
as an equilibrium scenario when t > t3.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4
To show which are the candidate equilibrium locations t > t, we investigate the sign of rd
and rc for all  <  0trade:
Assume that n  2nh   2+ 1 > 0. Then, in the absence of carbon tax, both rc and rd
are positive so that coagglomeration in the large country (1; 1) should be an equilibrium and
nh should be equal to n. However, this would imply n  2nh   2+ 1 < 0 and contradicts our
rst assumption. The only candidate location equilibrium such that nh  n2  
 
  1
2

are the
four spatial congurations (1; 1),
 
1; sd

, (1; 0) and (sc; 0).
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Then, we investigate whether these candidate equilibrium locations are compatible with the
trade condition  <  0trade. To do so, we have to rank thresholds 
0
a, 
0
c, 
0
d and 
0
trade over the
interval (t; tmax). Recalling that these thresholds are all monotonic decreasing functions of t,
we only need this ranking at the two extreme values of the carbon tax, that is t and tmax.
Let us rst compare  0a(t), 
0
c(t) and 
0
d(t) with 
0
trade. First of all, recall that 
0
trade(t) =
 trade(t). The remaining threshold values write:
 0c (t) = 
0
d (t) = 2 (2  1)
a"d   a"c  m"d
("d   "c) (n+ 2  2n  1)
and
 0a (t) = 2 (2  1)
a"c   a"d +m"d
("c   "d) (n+ 2  1)
Given the positivity of  0trade (t), both expressions are positive and 
0
a (t) < 
0
c;d (t) = 
0
d (t).
We now take the di¤erence between  0trade(t) and the above thresholds. We obtain:
 0trade (t)   0d (t) = (a"c   a"d +m"d)
( 3n+ 2+ 4n  1 + 2n)
("d   "c) (n+ 1) (n+ 2  2n  1)
and
 0trade (t)   0a (t) = ( 3n+ 2+ 4n  1)
a"c   a"d +m"d
(n+ 1) (n+ 2  1) ("d   "c)
The rst expression is negatively signed due to positivity of  0trade (t). By contrast, the sign
of the second expression depends on the asymmetry of market size. Specically, we verify
that  0trade (t) 7  0a (t) when  ? (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2). Thus, the ranking of threshold values with
respect to the trade condition is  0a (t) < 
0
trade (t) < 
0
d (t) < 
0
c (t) for all  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2)
and  0trade (t) < 
0
a (t) < 
0
d (t) < 
0
c (t) for all  > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2).
To complete the analysis, we now compare these thresholds with the trade condition when
the carbon tax takes the maximum value tmax. We verify that:
 0trade (tmax)   0a (tmax) = 2n (2  1)
a"c   a"d +m"d
(n+ 2  1) ("d + n"d   n"c)
is negative due to positivity of  0trade (t), so that 
0
trade (tmax) < 
0
a (tmax) < 
0
d (tmax) < 
0
c (tmax).
Therefore at the maximum value of the carbon tax, the only spatial equilibrium compatible
with the trade condition is coagglomeration in the larger country (1; 1).
To summarize,  0trade(t) is lower than 
0
d (t) and 
0
c (t) for all t 2 (t; tmax) whereas  0trade(t)
can be higher or lower than  0a(t) when the size asymmetry is not too large. As all thresholds
value are monotonic decreasing functions with respect to the carbon tax, this implies that the
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curve  0trade(t) intercepts once the curve 
0
a(t) when  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) : Let us call t4 this
intercept that lies in the interval t 2 (t; tmax). Then, we verify that  0trade (t) 7  0a (t) when
t ? t4.
We can now dene which candidate location equilibrium are compatible with the trade
condition over the interval (t; tmax). If  > (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2),  0trade (t) < 
0
a (t) < 
0
d (t) <
 0c (t) for all t 2 (t; tmax), so that (1; 1) is the only location equilibrium compatible with the
trade condition. If, however,  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2), then spatial congurations (1; 1) and
(1; sd) can arise in equilibrium when t  t4 whereas coagglomeration (1; 1) is the only spatial
conguration equilibrium when t > t4.
6 Dirty rms have the highest marginal cost
In this section, we assume that the carbon tax reaches such a high level that the clean rms now
enjoy the lowest (post-tax) marginal cost, that is t > t. Then, we verify that  0trade <  trade,
yielding the following simplied trade condition:
 <  0trade (t) =
a+mn  t (n"d   n"c + "d)
n+ 1
(13)
with t < a+mn
"d+n("d "c) = t
0
max so that 0 < 
0
trade (t).
6.1 Long run spatial equilibrium
The inequality t > t implies that the spatial di¤erence in return to capital between the large
and the small country is now higher for clean rms (that is, rc > rd). In other terms,
because the carbon tax is high enough, dirty rms have now lower incentives to locate in the
large country than clean ones.
As a consequence, the equilibrium location of rms cannot involve an interior conguration
for each type of rms, that is rc = rd = 0. Moreover, we check that expressions (a  
(n + 1)(m + t"c) + n!) and (a   (n + 1)t"d + n!) entering rc and rd are positive for all
 <  0trade (t). Thus, the complete coagglomeration of rms in the small country cannot arise
because rc (nh = 0) > 0 and rd (nh = 0) > 0.
Finally, we show in Appendix 3 that (n   2nh   2 + 1) < 0 so that rc and rd are
decreasing in  . Thus, we can dene threshold values of trade cost that determine the switch
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from a spatial conguration to another. For that purpose, let us dene :
 0a (t) = 2 (2  1)
a+mn (1  )  ("d + n ("d   "c) (1  )) t
n+ 2  1 ;
 0c (t) = 2 (2  1)
a m (n+ 1)  t ("c + n ("c   "d))
n+ 2  2n  1 ;
 0d (t) = 2 (2  1)
a+mn (1  )  ("d + n ("d   "c) (1  )) t
n+ 2  2n  1 ;
where  0a (t) and 
0
d (t) are obtained by requiringr
d = 0 at spatial congurations (sc = 1; sd = 1)
and (sc = 1; sd = 0), respectively, whereas  0c (t) is obtained by requiring r
c = 0 at spatial con-
gurations (sc = 1; sd = 0). We can easily check that  0c > 
0
d > 
0
a > 0.
In order to dene all possible spatial congurations, let us consider:
s^tc = ~s
t
c +

1   and s^
t
d = ~s
t
d  
1  

:
which conrms that imposing a carbon tax higher than the threshold t erodes the attractiveness
of the large country for dirty rms.
Then, the possible spatial congurations (s^tc; s^
t
d) are as follows:
(i) Agglomeration of dirty rms in the smaller country and partial selection of clean rms
in the larger country ( s^tc; 0) when  > 
0
c(t);
(ii) Perfect selection of clean rms in the larger country and dirty rms in the smaller
country ( 1; 0) when  0c(t) >  >  0d(t);
(iii) Partial selection of dirty rms and agglomeration of clean ones in the larger country
( 1; s^td) when 
0
d(t) >  >  0a(t);
(iv) Co-agglomeration in the larger country ( 1; 1) when  6  0a(t).
Clearly, the decline in trade cost induces the relocation of rms from the smaller to the
larger country. The mechanisms driving this progressive agglomeration to the larger country
are similar as when the carbon tax is lower than t: trade integration weakens the dispersion
force (due to competition) whereas it strengthens the agglomeration force (due to the market
size advantage of country H). The only di¤erence is that as clean rms now enjoy the lowest
net marginal cost, they are the rst ones to relocate to the larger country when trade costs
fall below  0c(t). By contrast, dirty rms stay longer in the small market in order to protect
themselves from competition induced by clean rms, and they start relocating to the large
country only when trade cost fall below  0d(t).
Then, we can determine whether or not each one of these spatial conguration can arise
under the trade condition  <  0trade. We obtain the following result:
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Proposition 4 Given t 2 (t; tmax) and  2 [0;  0trade) ; there exists a threshold value of the
carbon tax t04 such that:
(a) if t  t4 and  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2), then spatial congurations (1; 1) and (1; s^td) are
equilibria locations
(b) if t > t4 and  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2), or if   (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2), co-agglomeration in
the larger country (1; 1) is the only equilibrium location.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
When the carbon tax is higher than t, only the most concentrated spatial congurations
( 1; 1) and (1; s^td) can arise in equilibrium. This is not surprising as we show in section 4 that
the rise in the carbon tax (from 0 to t) triggers the exclusion of the most dispersed spatial
congurations.
The intuition for this result is the same as in section 4, and comes from the no-trade e¤ect.
The carbon tax renders the trade condition even more binding (d 0trade=dt < d trade=dt <
0) so that threshold values  0c and 
0
d are always higher than 
0
trade and the most dispersed
spatial congurations are not compatible with the trade condition anymore. The only spatial
congurations ensuring that trade is protable for rms are (1; 1) and (1; s^td). Specically,
coagglomeration (1; 1) is always compatible with the trade condition whereas the conguration
(1; s^td) can arise if and only if t < t4 and  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) (so that 
0
a < 
0
trade).
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 4 when  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) (left panel) and  >
(3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) (right panel), respectively.
6.2 Pollution
Let us now analyze how global pollution evolves as the economy moves from spatial cong-
uration (1; 1) to (1; s^td). The level of emissions when all rms are agglomerated in the larger
country being decreasing with the carbon tax (with dEt (1; 1) =dt =  > 0), global emissions
are lower when t > t for all  <  0a(t). Regarding the spatial conguration (1; s^
t
d), the level of
global emissions can be written as follows
E
 
1; s^td
  E  ~stc; 1+ l (2  1)

1
2
   
t

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When When
Figure 4: Location equilibria for all t > t
with

 = (2  1) ("d   "c) ["c + "d + n ("d   "c) (1  2)] > 0
  = 2 (2  1) [("d   "c) (a+mn  2mn) +m"c]   (n+ 2  1) ("d   "c)
and
E (1; 1) ? E (1; s0d) for all  ?  0a(t)
Therefore, trade integration is still detrimental to the environment when t > t. Moreover,
it is readily veried that a (t) >  0a(t) and dE (~s
t
c; 1) =d > dE (1; s^
t
d) =d . These properties
allow us to illustrate the pollution paths with respect to the level of trade cost under the three
main cases: absence of taxation, t < t and t > t. Precisely, the evolution of pollution when
t < t is depicted by making the assumption that  < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) and t2 < t while
 < (3n+ 1) = (4n+ 2) and t < t4 are assumed to be checked when t > t.
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Unsurprisingly, the above Figure illustrates that a carbon tax policy is environmentally more
e¢ cient for a high level of taxation. The rst reason is that the Pigouvian e¤ect is proportional
to the level of taxation. The second one lies on the fact that the carbon tax may be high enough
to make the large country an unprotable location choice for all dirty rms. Indeed, at a level
of trade cost within the range
 

0
a (t) ; 
0
d (t)

and after taxation, the spatial congurations (1; 1)
and (sc; 1) cannot be equilibria. As a consequence, some dirty rms relocate in the small country
with a strong and positive environmental outcome.
As said before, trade liberalization is at the origin of more pollution whatever the location
equilibrium of the economy. However, observe that when the two types of rms are not fully
agglomerated in the large country, the detrimental e¤ect of trade liberalization on pollution is
stronger when the level of taxation is high and above t. Indeed, in this case, trade liberalization
acts as an agglomeration force of the most polluting rms in the large country. In contrast, the
environmental consequences are less important when t < t because these are the less polluting
rms that relocate toward this country.
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